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Weapons are an essential element in warfare. But not all parties in armed 
conflicts have easy access to the legal gun market or sufficient financial 
resources, as was the case for the forces of the newly proclaimed 
Indonesian Republic during the Indonesian war of Independence (1945-
1949). This colonial war is historically infamous for its extreme violent 
chapters of guerilla and counter-guerrilla tactics, and its political sensitivity 
and multisided perspectives, which this article cannot escape to reflect upon 
as well. 1  Weapons are inevitably an important source of violence, but 
surprisingly absent as a topic of research in historiography about this war. 
This article exemplifies how the Indonesian Republic could get its hands on 
weapons, venturing on the thin, controversial line between trade and 
smuggling at the final stage of the war. 
In 1945, many Japanese weapons, varying from small guns to fighter 
aircrafts, were distributed among Indonesian police forces and passed on to 
Republican fighters, yet still the Indonesian Republican Army was short on 
weapons when the war started.2 However, other methods were found in 
acquiring weapons from the Dutch colonial army, by either theft or 
purchase from collaborating and corrupted colonial soldiers.3 Alternatively, 
the Republic assembled its armory by purchasing weapons abroad. 
Singapore and the Philippines provided solid markets outside Dutch 
                                                 
1 B. Luttikhuis and D.A. Moses, ‘Introduction. Colonial Counterinsurgency and 
Mass Violence:  the Dutch empire in Indonesia’ in:  idem ed.,  Colonial 
Counterinsurgency and Mass Violence: the Dutch Empire in Indonesia (London and New 
York, NY 2014) 1-24: 18-19. 
2 W.G.J. Remmelink, ‘The Emergence of the New Situation: The Japanese Army on 
Java After the Surrender’,  Kabar Seberang: Sulating Maphilindo 4 (1978) 57-74:  60; B.  
Bouman, ‘“Operatie Mariam Bee”. Een gelaagde Republikeinse wapensmokkelactie 
vanuit Singapore in 1946’ in: J.Th. Lindblad, W. van der Molen and C. Fasseur ed., 
Macht en majesteit opstellen voor Cees Fasseur bij zijn af scheid als hoogleraar in de geschiedenis 
van Indonesie ̈ aan de Universiteit Leiden (Leiden 2002) 116-131: 116-117. 
3 Bouman, ‘“Operatie Mariam Bee”’, 117-118. According to Bouman, Tegal was the 





colonial waters but within the sight of Dutch colonial authorities.4 In Dutch 
eyes, the latter was smuggling. Indeed, these weapon purchases happened in 
a shadow economy of unknown proportions that comprised of sincere 
revolutionaries, corrupt government officials, bona-fide businessmen, 
experienced criminals and everything in between.5 Little has been published 
about weapons and weapons trade in the history of this war. The topic 
touches upon many questions around colonial violence and the legitimacy 
of colonial rule.6  
As pointed out by professor Eric Tagliacozzo, smuggling across the 
porous borders between especially the Dutch and British Southeast Asian 
colonies, either as continuation of ‘age-old commodity lines only designated 
now as contrabanding by area governments’, or as opportunities to make 
money from changing political circumstances, historically interacted with 
larger structures of society. 7 Smuggling may have been a profitable scheme 
of resistance of local peoples against the expanding reach and technological 
power of colonial states. In addition, the dynamics of state making and 
solidification of borders by colonial regimes that tried to control trade in all 
of its aspects, created opportunities for criminals and encouraged 
smuggling. 8  As Tagliacozzo argues, this was specifically the case with 
weapons trade, which knew a long tradition in Southeast Asia and seemed 
hard to control.9 When the Dutch and British colonial regimes realized how 
                                                 
4  H. Wagner, ‘Where did the Weapons Come From?’, Kabar Seberang: Sulating 
Maphilindo 19-20 (1988) 118-132: 119-122. 
5  ‘Illegal’,  being defined  by the adversary (in this  case the Dutch colonial 
government), is of course a qu estionable term in the context of the Indonesian War 
of Independence, or any topic in which the legitimacy of colonial rule itself is at 
stake. 
6 An illuminating exception is the article of Ben Bouman (mentioned above),  about 
a smuggling affair in 1946 that preludes the case I deal with. Bouman bases his 
article chiefly on interviews he held with the main  smugglers, who, after the war,  
entered Indonesia’s diplomatic service and later migrated to the Netherlands. See 
for enthralling tales of smuggle between Java and Singapore the essays (in 
Indonesian) in: K. Mochtar ed., Memoar Pejuang Republik Indonesia Seputar “Zaman 
Singapura”, 1945-1950 [Indonesian Soldiers’ memories of  the “Age of  Singapore”, 1945-1950] 
(Jakarta 1992). 
7 E. Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders. Smuggling and States Along a Southeast 
Asian Frontier, 1865–1915 (New Haven, CT and London) 8-9. 
8 Ibidem, 297, 363, 373. 
9 Ibidem, 290-294. 




uncontained arms trade in Southeast Asia was, they ‘thought better of 
selling weapons indiscriminately.’ 10  Yet, new boundaries were new 
opportunities for profit. The traffic of weapons enlarged as the events of 
World War I and II transited arms flows not only across but also through 
Southeast Asia, reaching a dramatic climax during the war years.11 Short on 
weapons supplies, the Indonesian Revolutionary Army started sending out 
‘businessmen’ and ‘merchants’ to Singapore, at the time the largest allied 
weapons depot in Southeast Asia. Here, Chinese and Malay businessmen, 
driven by anti-colonial sentiment and assisted by corrupted British and 
Dutch army officers, supplied large storages of cheap weapons. From 1947 
onward the Dutch naval blockade around Java’s northeastern coast forced 
smugglers to apply alternative strategies, using speedboats and airplanes, the 
latter increasingly flown by allied war pilots, while the center of smuggling 
partly shifted to Malaysia and Thailand.12 From 1947 onward, there is an 
increase of reports of unregistered (‘illegal’) flights carried out by ad-hoc 
established airline corporations.13 
I will highlight one specific, brilliant and filmic weapon deal, 
documented in the archives of the Attorney General of the Dutch East 
Indies, 1945-1950. 14 In the late summer of 1948, a group of illustrious 
British and American ex-naval officers and Indonesian rebels arranged a 
rendezvous for an enormous weapon deal on a small island in the Riau 
archipelago, using speedboats and an amphibious aircraft. Though they 
were ambushed and captured by Singaporean and Dutch colonial police 
forces, their story indicates the existence of a large and quite professional 
circle of opium and weapons smugglers. Investigating this thrilling case, 
known as the ‘Airabu affair’, helps us to initiate in clarifying the connectivity, 
width, impact, and meaning of smuggling in Indonesia and the surrounding 
                                                 
10 Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 309. 
11 Ibidem. 
12 Ibidem, 128. 
13 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, 1945-1954 
(hereafter: NA, BZ),  inv. nr. 9969.  Also accessible online via:  
http://www.hdekker.info/DIVERSEN/NEI47-49.htm, accessed 15 June 2016.  
Well recorded are the flights of various Dakota’s, Catalina’s and other airplanes of 
Siamese Airways, P.O.A.S.  (Pacific Overseas  Airline Limited) T.A.A.S.  (Trans 
Asiatic Air Services  Siam) directed by John Coast and R.R. Cobley,  mainly to  and 
from Yogyakarta to various places in South and Southeast Asia. 
14 Nationaal Archief,  Den Haag, procureur-generaal bij  het Hooggerechtshof van 





parts of Southeast Asia during the war years. Barely researched, smuggling 
proves a promising topic to explore the war economy of specifically the 
Indonesian war of Independence, but probably many other wars as well, 




The Airabu affair: prolusion 
 
In the late afternoon of Monday 13 September 1948, a small motorboat, 
named ‘Gladys Mary’, entered the bay of a tiny, uninhabited tropical island 
known as Airabu (literally: ‘grey water’), which is part of the Anambas 
Archipelago in the Riau Islands. 15 This small archipelago is located about 
280 kilometers northeast of Singapore. Little is known of its history. During 
the occupation of the Riau by the Japanese 25th army, the sparsely populated 
islands were likely overlooked.16 However, the arrival of the Gladys Mary 
would trigger a chain of events that would draw these tranquil islands into 
the spotlight of public attention in the Dutch East Indies, Singapore, and 
the USA. 
 On board were the captain of the ship, an assistant named ‘Junus’, an 
Australian woman as the boat’s cook and Carlton A. Hire, a former British 
naval officer who lived in Singapore. 17  Together with a Singaporean 
businessman, Caesar Houghton, Hire had set up a meeting for a huge 
weapon deal in the Airabu bay with potential buyers from the Sumatran 
branch of anticolonial resistance. But what Hire did not know, was that 
these buyers as well as this illustrious Caesar Houghton were not who they 
claimed they were. 
                                                 
15 Currently the island is also known as Pulau Kiabu, and is still uninhabited. 
16 Nowadays the islands are chiefly mentioned in relation to diving tourism and vast 
exploitation of oil and gas  reserves, t riggering population growth. See: E. Macguire,  
‘Asia's top five tropical island paradises’, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/04/13/sport/south-east-asia-sailing/index.html, 
accessed 19 April 2016; M. Aritonang and W. Ajistyatama, ‘Anambas blessed with 
abundant resources’. Http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/02/17/natuna-
anambas-blessed-with-abundant-resources.html, accessed 19 April 2016. 
17 For a full overview of the main characters who appear in  this article, see the 
scheme in  appendix 1.  For the sake of clarity,  some persons of lesser importance 
are left out. 






Fig. 1: Carlton Hire. Source: S.A., ‘Airabu Arms 
Men Appeal’, The Straits Times, 21 January 1949, 1 
(in NA, PG, inv. nr. 186 III). 
 
The weapon deal had cost months of preparation, and involved 
numerous persons in various smuggling networks all over Southeast Asia. I 
will give a short description of these networks first, to keep the story 
uncluttered and emphasize the enormous scale of smuggling in the late 
1940s in this region. On top of a tangled cluster of smugglers we find a 
select group of corrupt American and Pilipino businessmen and army 
officials. They were the prime operators of opium and weapons smuggling 
in Southeast Asia at the time. In early 1948, Hire came into contact with 
Martin H. Tinio, son of the youngest general in the Philippine 
Revolutionary Army, Manuel Tinio. Martin Tinio possessed a small aviation 
enterprise and had caught the attention of Singaporean and Dutch colonial 
police and intelligence services, for he managed an expanding network of 





from Manilla to Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia. 18 Until then, however, 
the Dutch had not been able to catch Tinio or any of his pilots or associates 
red handed. Hire, who had met Tinio in April 1948, became one of Tinio’s 
agents in Singapore.  
 In July of the same year, Hire had an appointment in Bangkok with a 
relative of Tinio, ‘Captain’ Jimmy E. Johnston, an American captain of a 
merchant vessel with whom he had been in contact for about a month. The 
‘Captain’ offered Hire 2,000 Browning Rifles and gave him a list of weapon 
supplies in Manilla, provided by him and Tinio. These weapons were to be 
transported by Johnston to Bangkok, were he instructed Hire to sell them 
to Siamese communists who would pay with gold from a bank robbery and 
stolen from K.L.M. airplanes.19 The deal however was a failure. Allegedly, 
Dutch police officers were able to trace and reclaim the stolen gold. On top 
of that, Johnston and Tinio were not able to provide their pilots with 
sufficient fuel needed for the journey back to Singapore.20 Johnston claimed 
he stored the weapons in a cave on Airabu. This was the last thing Hire ever 
heard from Johnston. Back in Singapore, he decided to send one of Tinio’s 
pilots to ‘interview the Far East Representative’ (Johnston), but he was 
untraceable, and the weapons were never found.21 From information in 
contemporary newspapers and the archival material in the National 
Archives in The Hague, it becomes clear Johnston must have smelled 






                                                 
18 NA, PG, inv.  nr. 186 part I  (inv. nr. 186 consists of five parts, numbered  with 
Roman numerals), herein: ‘Proces verbaal tegen Hire, 18 sept 1948,  door J.W.J. de 
Haas’. 
19 S.A., ‘Stolen Gold for Arms Payment’, The Straits Times, 26 January 1949, 1. 
20  The combined weight of weapons and fuel on the outbound journey from 
Manilla to Airabu would completely drain the tanks. S.A., ‘Stolen Gold for Arms 
Payment’, The Straits Times, 26 January 1949, 1. 
21  S.A., ‘Miljoenen wapendump nabij Aer Aboe onvindbaar’,  Het Dagblad, 28 
January 1949, 1. 
22 Ibidem; NA PG, inv.  nr.  186 I, “Proces  verbaal tegen Hire, 18 sept 1948,  door 
J.W.J. de Haas”. 




The thin line between opium and weapons smuggle 
 
During the summer of 1948, Hire’s movements had been traced by the so-
called ‘Secretary of Special Services’ Sybrand van Hulst, who was stationed 
at the Dutch consulate in Singapore. When civil administration over the 
Riau islands was returned from Singapore to Tanjung Pinang in 1946, the 
local governor advised to maintain an intelligence branch at the consulate in 
cooperation with the Netherlands Indies Intelligence Force (NEFIS). The 
governor heavily protested when in 1947 the Dutch government planned to 
abolish the post. He claimed that Singapore ‘was a center of Indonesian 
nationalist political activity and international trade by the republicans, 
closely intertwined with its political objectives’. 23 Consequently, Van Hulst 
was sent to Singapore by direct order of Attorney-General H.W. Felderhof, 
to whom Van Hulst frequently reported. An immense stream of intelligence 
correspondence followed. Van Hulst reflected weekly on matters ranging 
far beyond Singapore and the Riau archipelago, such as international trade 
and smuggling, political developments in Singapore, the activities and 
publications of the ‘Indonesia Office’ (the Republican department in 
Singapore), and encroaching Chinese communism in the region.  
 In 1948, Van Hulst followed Hire and Johnston to Bangkok to 
investigate their activities, and came to the conclusion that: 
 
for the last two months, with irregular intervals, flights are being 
performed between Java’s southern coast, Singora [Thailand, ed.], 
Singapore and a place somewhere near Malacca,  using a ‘Catalina’ 
flying boat owned by Martin Tinio.24  
 
These flights happened right under the nose of – and likely with knowledge 
of some – (colonial) officials and police forces. The principal commodity 
was opium. But it was rumored that during the last flight (in early august 
1948), there had been weapons aboard as well. The pilot of this flight, 
Raymond Coombs (ex-RAF), was questioned by Van Hulst, as he was 
                                                 
23 Note that the governor speaks of ‘trade’ instead of ‘smuggling’. NA, PG, inv. nr. 
215, ‘Brief van de PG aan de directeur Binnenlands Bestuur, 31 januari 1947, no 
460/A3’. 





known to be in touch with Tinio and Hire. 25 Coombs’ report shows there 
was a paper thin line between weapon and drug trafficking, and, moreover, 
that it was their investigation of opium smuggling that led the Dutch police 
to the weapon deal at Airabu.  
 Large amounts of opium, stored at various locations on Java, were 
being distributed by a network of Republican Indonesian officials and 
Australian and American pilots to Malacca and Singapore, where it was sold 
for hefty sums.26 The opium trade has played a prominent role in Southeast 
Asian history. In Indonesia, opium was formally sold under regulations of 
the Dutch government. Up until about 1895, Chinese revenue farmers were 
allowed to produce and sell opium under contracts with the colonial 
government. But from a Dutch point of view, an increasingly wealthy and 
powerful Chinese opium farming class started to influence local economies 
and societies, endangering both the wellbeing of the indigenous population 
and undermining the power of the colonial government 27  Opium 
production was therefore nationalized and monopolized by the Dutch 
colonial state between 1895 and 1915 under the so-called ‘Opium and Salt 
Administration’ (Opium- en Zoutregie; introduced in 1903). Although, in 
line with international agreements, opium production was to be diminished, 
it continued to be a substantial part of government revenue and therefore 
opium policy was never as strict in practice as it was on paper. The opium 
trade had always been the most lucrative product within the revenue 
farming system and had provided a steady financial supply under both the 
revenue farming and state monopoly system. Therefore it was unattractive 
to the Dutch government to keep opium production low and under 
control.28 Dutch anti-opium campaigns in the colony may suggest that the 
colonial state attempted to achieve limitation of opium consumption in the 
twentieth century, but this has been typed a ‘legal hypocrisy’. In reality, 
                                                 
25 NA, PG, inv. nr. 186 I,  ‘Verklaring van Raymond Coombs, 25-28 September 
1948’. 
26 Though it is unclear if Dutch colonial officials were involved in this network as  
well, these were also active in opium smuggling. 
27 A. Wahid, From Revenue Farming to State Monopoly. The Political Economy of  Taxation in 
Colonial Indonesia, Java c. 1816-1942 (Utrecht 2013) 76-80, 122-129, 138-139. 
28 Wahid, From Revenue Farming to State Monopoly, 4, 75. 




opium profits reached numbers into millions, often a thousand times more 
than official Dutch anti-opium campaign budgets.29  
 After the Japanese surrendered and the Dutch re-occupied the Dutch 
East Indies, the Opium Administration was reinstated, but in the chaos of 
war it appeared even harder to regulate the substance. Many corrupt Dutch 
and Indonesian officials set up their own opium trading networks.30 In 1948 
for example, the Indonesian minister of finance Alexander Andries Maramis 
was accused of involvement in unregistered opium transport to Singapore, 
by ‘abusing his position in the Committee of Good Offices.’ 31 Another 
important official, the illustrious ‘Dr. Oetoyo’, was suspected of having 
earned at least 102,000 Malayan dollars (M$) from opium import to 
Singapore, where he was head of the Indonesia Office.32 The spider in the 
                                                 
29 H. Derks, History of  the Opium Problem. the Assault on the East, ca. 1600-1950 (Leiden 
and Boston, MA 2012) 348; Wahid, From Revenue Farming to State Monopoly, 126-129. 
30 Derks, History of  the Opium Problem, 348-54, 369-372; E. Vanvugt, Wettig opium. 350 
jaar Nederlandse  opiumhandel  in de Indische archipel (Haarlem 1985) 340-354,  362-375.  
The cooperation of collaborating state officials was often crucial to the su ccess of 
contraband undertakings. See: Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 6. 
31  NA, PG, inv. nr. 187, ‘Rapport  Regeringsvoorlichtingsdienst a.n.  1658, 16 
augustus 1948’. The ‘Committee of Good Offices’  (Committee van Goede 
Diensten) was established under pressure of the UN after the Renville-Agreement 
of 1948, and consisted  of a Belgian representative,  appointed by the Netherlands, 
an Australian representative, appointed by Indonesia and an American 
representative. 
32 NA, PG, inv. nr. 187, ‘Centraal opsporingsblad no. 29,  29 Juli 1949. Signalering v.  
Personen’; inv. nr. 188,  ‘Verklaring van Moekarto (alias  Sowigno), “Financial 
coordinator of Republic of Indonesia for South East Asia and  Australia.” 2-4 
oktober 1948’. Oetoyo was no doctor, but had been in the Netherlands to study,  
and earned  the title ‘drs.’ (equivalent to a Master degree). This might have confused 
the British authorities in  Singapore,  who changed  ‘drs’ into ‘dr.’, which Oetoyo 
eagerly copied. He was quite a noteworthy figure in Singapore during the war years, 
living a remarkably wealthy life (likely funded by opium trade). Leading the 
Indonesia Office, he fought a lengthy propaganda-war with the Dutch Embassy in 
Singapore. He was closely involved in the operation of the P.O.A.S. and associated 
with carrier flights out by well-known smugglers such as John Coast and R.R. 
Cobley (See:  NA, BZ, inv. nr. 9969,  herein:  ‘24.05.1948’ and ‘12.03.1949’.) See also: 
The Argus (Melbourne, Vic.: 1848 - 1957), July 14 1950,  2., ‘Personality Oetoyo: an 
agent of friendship’; The Singapore Free Press, 25 August 1948, 1, ‘Opium racket: Dr.  
Oetoyo says “no knowledge”’. It is not entirely clear if Van Hulst, who wrote 





web was Tony Wen, a Chinese-Indonesian sports instructor and semi-
professional soccer player. 33  Wen, who was suspected of Communist 
sympathies, had founded an ‘international brigade’ during the first Dutch 
military operation in 1947, that according to Dutch sources functioned as a 
kind of Chinese foreign legion. He also held ‘seditious speeches’ for Radio 
Yogya and was infamous among Dutch officials for his strong anticolonial 
attitude.34  
                                                                                                             
power parity, 102,000 M$ would nowadays equal at least 500,000 euros, or 860,000 
euros if Van Hulst means American dollars. This is  calculated as  follows: The value 
of the M$ was set  as £1.00 = M$8.6.  (For the historical value of the Malayan dollar,  
see: A. V. M. Horton, ‘“So Rich  as to  Be Almost Indecent”: Some Aspects of Post-
War Rehabilitation in Brunei, 1946-1953’, Bulletin of  the School of  Oriental and African 
Studies 58.1 (1995) 91-103: 91.) 102,000 M$ would thus equal roughly £11,860 in 
1948.  The real price or commodity value of that  amount would be about £388,900,  
or roughly €500,000. However, expressed in income wealth or labor value the 
amount would be even higher, up to roughly €1,9 million. For the historic value of 




1 June 2016.  
In this article following amounts of money, expressed in today’s PPP, are calculated 
based on the above described method, based on the real price value. 
33 He was also known as  Boen Kin To or Wen Chin[g] Tao. NA, PG, inv.  nr. 186 I, 
‘Centraal opsporingsblad no.29 29 jul. 1949.  Signalering v. Personen.’; inv. nr.  188 
‘File Tony Wen’; inv. nr 904, ‘Tony Wen’. 
34 NA, PG, inv. nr. 187, ‘Centraal opsporingsblad no.29 29 jul. 1949. Signalering v.  
Personen: Tony Wen’, ‘Brief van S. van Hulst aan PG, Singapore, 19 juni 1948’. 






Fig. 2: Tony Wen. Source: NA, PG, inv. nr. 188, ‘File Tony Wen’. 
 
In August 1948, Wen was aboard the flight operated by Coombs, 
from Bangkok to Karimun Island to the south of Singapore. There he 
arranged for the appropriate aeronautical maps with his brother, who sold 
the opium on the streets of Singapore. They continued to a lake near Kediri 
in East Java, to pick up opium and other contraband, supposedly 
weapons.35 After flying back to Karimun, Coombs returned to Bangkok and 
claimed to have received 13,000 M$ for this single trip. 36 He made two 
more flights, earning similar amounts of money, but by then Van Hulst had 
gotten wind of the opium smugglers. Two days before the weapon deal at 
                                                 
35 NA, PG, inv. nr. 186 I,  ‘Verklaring van Raymond Coombs, 25-28 September 
1948’. 





Airabu went down, Wen and Coombs were arrested in Singapore.37 Two 
weeks later, Wen was released for lack of evidence and fled to China.38  
The opium smuggling network appeared to be well organized. 
According to Van Hulst, it was facilitated on Java by Moekarto 
Notowidigdo, head of the Republican department of the Opium and Salt 
Administration, who was arrested in September 1948. After interrogating 
Coombs, Van Hulst discerned a direct link between opium and arms 
smuggling, and surmised that weapons were either exchanged for opium or 
paid for with money earned with opium sales in Singapore. An informant of 
Van Hulst eavesdropped on Wen in Kuala Lumpur in June 1948, where he 
spoke with members of the Malayan Communist Party about possibly 
supplying weapons to communist rebels on Sumatra and Java, financed with 
opium money.39 But this conversation was insufficient evidence to prove 
that the network around Hire and Tinio was in possession of opium, or that 
Wen was in possession of weapons. The link between weapons and opium 
smuggling was chiefly proven by the use of the same airplanes, integration 
of various small airline companies and interaction between the ‘main 
culprits.’ 40 It was estimated that at least 2 tons of opium were smuggled by 
the Catalina aircraft from East Java to Singapore via Karimun and other 
small islands along with various commodities, stolen goods, and weapons, 
shipped from Singapore to Thailand, totaling a value of about 24 million(!) 
US dollars. 41  As the Dutch knew from experience, opium trade was 
extraordinary profitable. Obviously the Dutch, who claimed a state 
monopoly on the distribution of opium, labeled transportation of opium 
outside of the Dutch East Indies by third parties as smuggling, and 
considered massive commerce in illegal opium therefore a highly dangerous 
threat to their revenue and power. 42  Both Dutch and Republican 
                                                 
37 NA, PG, inv. nr. 188, ‘File Tony Wen’; inv. nr. 187. 
38 NA, PG, inv. nr. 187; Yong Mun Cheong, The Indonesian Revolution and the Singapore 
Connection, 1945-1949 (Leiden 2003) 132. 
39 NA, PG, inv. nr. 187, ‘Brief van S. van Hulst aan PG, Singapore, 19 juni 1948’. 
40 Ibidem; NA, BZ, 9969. 
41 That would be about an astonishing 360 million dollars nowadays. NA, PG, inv.  
nr. 187, ‘Brief van S. van Hulst aan PG, Singapore, 19 juni 1948.’; Bouman, 
‘“Operatie Mariam Bee”’, 117. 
42 Tagliacozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders, 7. 




Indonesians continuously questioned the legality of each other’s actions. 43 
Both claimed the other side was wrong and evil, and pointed to individuals 
on the other side that abused their powers and resources for personal 
benefit. Sinister businessmen and corrupt officials like Dr. Oetoyo and 
Moekarto Notowidigdo lived expensively on opium revenues, as Dutch 
state opium patrons had done before, in their case accorded with the 
corresponding but self-made laws. 
 
 
The deal was no deal: an adventure derailed 
 
The failed deal with ‘Captain’ Johnston made Hire realize how profitable 
arms smuggling was. While looking for another buyer, he was contacted by 
Caesar Houghton. Houghton placed a huge weapons order worth $60,000 
and also solved the fuel problem by arranging an extra fuel transport by 
boat.44 He claimed he intended to buy the weapons in cooperation with a 
group of Indonesian revolutionaries from Sumatra, who agreed on taking 
extra fuel to the deal in return.45 Hire approached Tinio and discovered the 
weapons Johnston had promised were still in Manilla. Without hesitating 
Hire prepared the deal. An American pilot and business partner of Tinio, 
Albert William Onstott, agreed to fly the Catalina with a selected crew of 
fellow American pilots to Manilla, pick up the weapons, and head for 
Airabu. There they planned to assemble with Hire and Houghton and the 
Indonesian revolutionaries. The deal is described in a report written by 
Houghton, that ‘reads like a big thriller.’ 46 On Monday afternoon, thirteenth 
of August 1948, Hire spotted the rebels’ boat, which had been there since 
the previous day. Relieved that they had made it, Hire cheerfully met 
Houghton’s buyers, exclaiming ‘Merdeka!’ (Freedom!), a popular Indonesian 
salute. The rebels’ headman shouted back: ‘Merdeka tetap!’ (freedom 
forever!), and confirmed that they had brought 800 gallons of fuel for the 
return flight of the airplane on their boat. That evening, Hire and Roberts 
                                                 
43  The Dutch Consulate and Indonesia Office in Singapore fought quite a 
propaganda war by publishing articles in  Dutch colonial newspapers  and  in the 
‘Bulletin of the Indonesia Office’. 
44 NA, PG, inv. nr. 186 I, ‘Verslag S.v.D. van Hulst, 26 december 48’. 
45 Ibidem. 
46 NA, PG, inv. nr. 186 I, ‘Rapporten over Houghton’, ‘Brief van S. van Hulst aan  





entertained themselves with their Australian cook. Meanwhile, Houghton 
and his assistant, Junus, stayed on the speedboat of the headman. 47 They 
had very different views on what would happen the next day. 
 
Fig. 3: The Catalina (registration number P.I.C.-224), used by the American pilots in 
the Airabu affair. Source: S.A., unknown article, The Morning Tribune, 2 December 
1948, 9 (in NA, PG, 186 III). 
 
The following morning, around eleven o’clock, the Catalina made a 
low pass over the bay and landed at Hire’s signal. Onstott and his pilots, 
stepped out and anchored the plane. Five cases with weapons were carried 
out of the plane and loaded onto the rebels’ boat. The situation soon took 
an unexpected turn; Hire and the American pilots insisted on checking the 
fuel cans in the ships’ cargo hold. Hire and Onstott entered the hold, Hire 
lifted one of the can’s covers, and saw seawater. At the same time, the 
‘headman’ blew his whistle, pulled out a gun and shouted ‘hands up!’48 Hire 
found himself surrounded by an overwhelming group of Singaporean and 
                                                 
47 NA, PG, inv. nr. 186 I, ‘Verslag S.v.D. van Hulst, 26 december 48’. 
48 Ibidem; NA, PG, inv.  nr.  186 Part  II, ‘Voorlopig onderzoek inzake internationale 
wapensmokkel Air Aboe’. 




Dutch police forces. The ‘headman’ was actually police inspector first class 
J.W.J. de Haas, selected for this mission by Van Hulst for his Indonesian 
looks. Junus worked for the Singaporean police, and Houghton was their 
prime informant.49  
 Van Hulst had planned this intervention since he had followed Hire 
to Bangkok in July 1948. He recruited Houghton once he got back to 
Singapore, who agreed to play an undercover role as ‘pseudo buyer’. In 
return he received a reward of 5,000 Malayan dollars.50 According to Van 
Hulst, he fulfilled his role ‘magnificently, with lots of fantasy and courage 
(…) misleading both the ‘Hire-ring’ as well as the ‘American-Filipino ring’ 
of Capt. Johnson-Onstott-Murray-Martin Tinio.’51 Van Hulst realized that 
the smugglers were continuously ahead of him, and therefore decided to set 
up a deal himself.52 Though he had merely hoped to prove the connection 
between arms and opium smuggling, he was more than satisfied to have 
caught most of the smugglers on his radar. There was little time and room 
for preparation, and he was lucky that Houghton knew how to play his part. 
When Houghton contacted Hire, he subtly hinted that Wen’s network was 
nearing its end under pressure of the police, so Hire would feel the urgency 
to speed up. 53  Hire quickly made the arrangements, while Van Hulst 
ordered De Haas to assemble a team. De Haas chartered a British Navy 
speedboat, and assisted by two superintendents of the Singaporean Criminal 
Investigation Department and five British Naval Police officers, he sailed to 
Airabu. In the evening of Monday the thirteenth, De Haas, Houghton and 
Junus made plans to arrest Hire and the American pilots in the cabin of the 
boat, so the actual intervention in the cargo hold was not part of the plan 
and largely improvisation.  
 In no time Hire and his crew were overpowered and arrested. The 
airplane was searched, and on board De Haas found 40 cases with 2,000 
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Browning rifles and more than 400,000 cartridges, with a total value of 
$340,000.54 De Haas also found an order list for more weapons, which Hire 
presumably planned to deliver on a following run.55 De Haas called for a 
Dutch navy ship, and in the evening the arrested were transported to 
Tanjung Pinang, where they were imprisoned.56 
 
 
Airabu’s aftermath: the legitimacy of a colonial war fought out in 
court 
 
What followed was a very politically sensitive court case that took place 
from December 1948 to January 1949, against the background of 
‘Operation Crow’, the second military action of the Dutch colonial army 
against the Indonesian Republicans. Three Americans and two British 
citizens, all former World War II soldiers, had been arrested by Singaporean 
and Dutch police in Dutch East Indies territorial waters, inveigled by these 
police forces to sell arms. The defendants and their lawyers were therefore 
eager to question the legitimacy of the Dutch-British-Singaporean police 
operation, as it had deliberately entrapped the suspects. 57  Furthermore, 
these suspects were British and American citizens, some of them war heroes. 
In light of the recent outbreak of violence in December 1948, the American 
public opinion was not on the side of the Dutch. This was not likely to 
change during the Airabu affair. In addition, the defendants’ lawyer was 
indignant about the treatment of the prisoners. For far too long, he 
complained, the prisoners had not been allowed to communicate with the 
outside world. In a letter to his parents, preserved in the archives, Hire 
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expressed great dissatisfaction about his treatment by the Dutch authorities, 
profiling himself as merely a victim of the circumstances.58  
 The American prisoners complained too. Onstott was dissatisfied 
that the only food they received was rice with some vegetables, which to his 
opinion was ‘barely edible.’59 The defendants’ strategy was to profile the 
suspects as some sort of tragic heroes, who, committed to the fate of the 
Republican Indonesians, got carried away by their passion for liberty and 
democracy. Perhaps the credibility of this argument suffers from the 
excessive amounts of money the opium and weapons transport had 
produced, but eventually it worked. The lawyers of the defendants based 
their appeals on the legitimacy of colonial law during the tumult of 
decolonization in Asia after World War II. On top of that, unclear 
boundaries of jurisdiction left considerable room for discussion; the 
involvement of police forces from different colonies, assisted by their 
various motherlands raised questions about which law applied; Dutch 
colonial law, as the alleged crime took place in Dutch territorial waters; 
Dutch law, as the police forces from Singapore were technically operating 
under the Dutch consulate; or Singaporean law, as they were arrested under 
the authority of Singaporean officials. The eventual penalty depended on 
which laws were applied.  
Was smuggling the proper terminology to describe the Airabu case? 
Estimating the criminality of the act depends entirely on which side one 
takes. The judge in Tanjung Pinang left no doubt: supplying arms to 
Indonesian rebels across the territorial borders of the Dutch East Indies 
without the proper Dutch legal documents was in the eyes of the 
Netherlands Indies Government, which he represented, a serious crime and 
a threat to internal and international security. 60  Special laws and 
international proclamations, designed in the context of earlier colonial wars 
and global diplomatic developments, strictly stipulated the transportation of 
arms across the Dutch-Anglo frontier in Southeast Asia, though throughout 
the twentieth century these laws had proved increasingly hard to enforce.61 
Naturally, the arrest of three American war pilots by Dutch colonial agents 
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caused quite some diplomatic turmoil. The American consul in Batavia was 
not very happy to see these pilots depicted as a bunch of licentious 
adventurers or international bandits. The senator of Oklahoma (the home 
state of Onstott), interfered and saw Hire clearly as the main culprit; the 
‘American youngsters’ were merely tricked, therefore innocent, and to 
return home as soon as possible.62 Eventually, all suspects confessed their 
involvement in the transport of weapons from Manilla to Airabu. However, 
they denied that it was smuggling, as they were not directly involved in the 
sale of these weapons to the Republicans. That had been, so they claimed, 
all Houghton’s responsibility. Moreover, they did not acknowledge the 
jurisdiction of the court. Eventually, Houghton’s statement was decisive for 
the conviction of all suspects. The fact that Hire had shouted “Merdeka!” to 
De Haas was decisive, as it indicated that Hire thought he dealt with, and 
thus from his perspective deliberately sold weapons to Indonesian 
revolutionaries. 63 The judge at Tanjung Pinang convicted the pilots to four, 
three and one-and-a-half year of prison, and Hire to seven years. 
Immediately, the diplomatic corpses of the UK and the USA started 
exerting political pressure to get their citizens out of prison. And with 
success. On 6 September 1949, the American pilots were pardoned and 
released. Ten days later, the court ruled that there was no legal basis to grant 
clemency to Hire. However, on the 21st of November, during the final days 
of the colony, the Attorney-General saw no point in retaining Hire anymore 
and relieved him as well.64  
A happy ending? Not quite. The American government closely 
followed the case, reading newspapers from Singapore and the Dutch East 
Indies. The Americans were interested not only because of the American 
suspects, but also because of the possible involvement of US troops in the 
Philippines. Furthermore, among the smuggled weapons was American 
material. This raised serious suspicions on the American base near Manilla, 
though it was already known that many weapons and other American army 
items had fallen into the hands of Philippine citizens after the Philippine 
independence in 1946. 65 But Airabu was the first affair that showed the 
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large scale of gunrunning from the Philippines to other parts of Southeast 
Asia. Later on, it appeared that a former American ex-army 
counterintelligence officer, who was specialized in weapons and drug theft 
and smuggling, headed the weapons smuggling network. During the trial in 
Tanjung Pinang, Onstott claimed the organization of this man, named 
George Murray, was actually the source of the weapons provided at Air 
Abu.66 Evidence found at Murray’s home suggested that his gang smuggled 
everything from carbines to light tanks and artillery. 67 He was never held 
responsible, as a couple of weeks after the Airabu Affair he was murdered. 
This murder was never resolved, concealing the case even more.68 
 
 
Conclusion: the Airabu affair in perspective 
 
There is a wide body of historiography, both in the Dutch, Indonesian and 
international academic scene, about the impact of Dutch and Indonesian 
militarism, guerilla tactics, counter-insurgency and the escalation of violence 
during the Indonesian war of Independence. Smuggling however, has so far 
remained at the background, which is not surprising, as it was often hidden 
from sight in history itself. The Airabu case is known because the smugglers 
were caught, their cases were published in newspapers and their files put in 
archives. There may be many cases of smuggling we do not know of, simply 
because the smugglers were never caught. Furthermore, it raises the 
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question: when do we speak of smuggling? For the Dutch colonial 
authorities, every undesired transport of commodity across the colonial 
territorial borders without the proper licenses was smuggling. Especially 
transport of opium (legally a state monopoly), gold, weapons, and other 
sensitive material such as fuel, liquor and valuable items that possibly 
undermined colonial power, was considered smuggling. By denying the 
Indonesians access to legally acquire these items, they not only enforced 
their disbelief in Indonesian independence, but also encouraged smuggling. 
For the Indonesians, who were unable to buy sufficient weapons on the 
markets the Dutch had access to, it was rightful trade in their own 
dominion. Fighting a war requires weapons, and one of the very few ways 
the Republicans of Indonesia could acquire these was by importing them on 
unregistered flights flown by allied pilots for whom it was mostly a chance 
to earn lifetime supplies of money. 
An important consequence of this problem may be that the colonial 
system presented a misleading picture of its own legal nature and mechanics, 
as no international legal basis was used in the court case. 69 The Dutch 
colonial legal system, therefore, obviously failed to create a fair legal 
framework about who was allowed to trade in or possess arms. The Dutch 
colonial authorities kept ‘regarding the Indonesians as foreigners’, and here 
we may find the ultimate source of the problem of smuggling and arms 
trade.70 
 Smuggling from and to the Riau Archipelago and other islands did 
not stop. Before and after the Airabu case, we find many short notes in the 
archives of the Attorney-General and other archives about smuggling. In 
1946, a Dutch police inspector investigated the rumors in Singapore about 
large-scale smuggling of weapons around Singapore in exchange for gold 
and opium from Java. A number of British officers did not cooperate 
during this investigation, and later on these were suspected of corruption 
and actual involvement in the smuggling. In 1948 and 1949 numerous boats, 
in some cases belonging to the British Royal Navy, carrying all sorts of 
goods seem to have crossed the Malacca and Karimata Strait, from Sumatra 
to Singapore and beyond. Occasionally a boat was caught, but usually the 
smugglers were apparently well able to circumvent the Dutch blockades.71 
                                                 
69 J.M. van der Kroef, ‘On the Writing of Indonesian History’, Pacif ic Affairs 31.4 
(1958) 352-371: 364. 
70 G. J. Resink, ‘Veronachtzaamde uitspraken’, Indonesia 8 (1955) 1-26: 17. 
71 Many cases are found in: NA, PG, inv nrs. 182-185, 190-191. 




The ‘Aceh Trading Company’ for example, was extraordinarily successful in 
transporting rubber and opium to Thailand in exchange for weapons. 72 
Larger transports, using aircrafts, however, appear more rarely in the 
archives and may have occurred less frequently. The administrative power 
of the colonial authorities was simply too limited, and the mandate of the 
Dutch intelligence and police officers of Singapore was insufficient to put 
smuggling to a stop. Cooperation with the British-Singaporean authorities 
was not always as spotless as may be suggested by this case. 73 The weak and 
porous borders of the archipelago had always been hard to protect. But 
during the war, it became even harder to the depleted Dutch and their 
colonial states to counter smuggling. It was simply too extensive, and there 
was little the Dutch were able to do. In this case a solution was found in 
deceiving the ‘culprits.’ Contrary to what some historians claimed, the 
Dutch colonial authorities were perhaps less powerful as a ‘police-state’ 
than they imagined.74 The means of the police intelligence services were 
limited, especially during the final war years.75 Additionally, facts about the 
functioning of the system were so secretly guarded at the time (and not 
rarely destroyed) that they remain largely unknown. Moreover, some Dutch 
army officials were involved in smuggling networks, playing very foul play, 
often against each other.76 
 The trail of the Airabu smugglers may have been intended by the 
Dutch Government to set an example against what they regarded bands of 
international adventurers and gangsters. The Airabu affair also stresses that 
to some, the war bared meaning beyond simply ‘one party fighting the 
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other’. To some contrabanders smuggling may have been a tool to ‘manage 
and manipulate the malleable reality of the colonial situation to local ends’, 
to others it was simply an opportunity to make money and perhaps find 
adventure. 77 It touches upon romanticized depictions of war, larded with 
exiting details that normally vivify war novels and movies. Such 
romanticizing may have played a role in the motives of the suspects in the 
Airabu case. 
 Finally, the case reveals that during the war the Dutch were eager to 
enter into international cooperation, actively seeking support for their 
causes that ranged from catching international criminals to countering 
Indonesian attempts to acquire, weapons, ammunition, and other tactical 
equipment. It is interesting to note that the Singaporean police offered its 
full cooperation. On top of that, the British government sought much less 
diplomatic confrontation after the conviction of Hire than the Americans 
did when ‘their’ pilots were convicted. Do we notice a classic dichotomy 
between ancient imperialists and anti-colonialists, fighting for liberty? In any 
sense, trade in products such as narcotics (opium), arms and goods was 
judged to be illegal particularly in context of colonial law. However, very 
subtly, the Airabu affair seems to reflect on the legitimacy of Dutch 
presence in Indonesia, at least during the Indonesian war of Independence, 
and perhaps even on the legitimacy of colonial law and colonialism itself. 
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